We provide characterizations of the set of outcomes that can be achieved by agenda manipulation for two prominent sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure. Tournaments and supermajority voting with arbitrary quota q are special cases of the general sequential voting games we consider. We show that when using the same quota, both procedures are non-manipulable on the same set of preference profiles, and that the size of this set is maximized under simple majority. However, if the set of attainable outcomes is not single-valued, then the successive procedure is more vulnerable towards manipulation than the amendment procedure. We also show that there exists no quota which uniformly minimizes the scope of manipulation, once this becomes possible.
Introduction
Many societies and institutions, when choosing among alternatives, resort to successive (multi stage) decision procedures, whereby different voters can determine, in a sequence of different steps, which alternatives are definitely out and which ones retain a chance to be considered again, until one of them is definitely selected. In this paper we study two families of classical methods of that sort, the amendment and the successive elimination procedures, both of which are used extensively in many parts of the world.
1
It is known since ancient times 2 that the order in which different alternatives are considered along a sequential decision procedure can affect the final choice that a given society may reach, even if the preferences of its members stay the same. Therefore, setting the agenda is a very influential decision, and whoever controls the order of vote often has the possibility to engage in agenda manipulation, that is, of determining what will be the outcome of the choice process.
3
That power is not absolute, however, since there may be cases where any agenda would lead to the same outcome, as long as the rest of features defining a rule remain unchanged, and others where the range of choices that may be obtained is limited to some subset of all possible alternatives. In this paper we analyze the extent to which, given the preferences of voters, an agenda setter could choose among several outcomes, and exactly what these outcomes may be in each voting situation. We provide characterization theorems that cover all variants of the amendment and the successive voting procedure, and indicate precisely what is the set of alternatives that may be reached at each voting situation by just changing the agenda under each of the rules in the class.
Our two families of rules, as well as other potential but less used ones, are part of a wider class based on the same principles, but differing on the details 1 Precise definitions of these rules are provided in section 2. These rules were named by that specify the paths to be followed in search of the winner, and the contribution of different voters to determine what path is taken.
The exact characteristics of a sequential rule are determined by combining several ingredients. The first one is what we can call a tree form, which determines two aspects of the sequential process. One is the number and the nature of actions that agents can take at any node, starting from an initial one, until a terminal node is reached at the end of each path. But since one and only one alternative will eventually be attached to each terminal node, in order to define trees, a tree form is also defined by any restriction that may be imposed on the possible assignment of the same alternative to different terminal nodes. The two families of procedures we study here are based on binary tree forms, where each nonterminal node has two successors. The second ingredient defining a sequential rule is the agenda, that is, the specific assignment of alternatives to terminal nodes, respecting the restrictions imposed by the tree form. That assignment determines what choices will be made by society after following the possible path that leads to each terminal node. In all the cases we study, an agenda is just an order over the alternatives, because we provide specific and unique rules that translate each possible order into a unique admissible assignment of alternatives to the terminal nodes of the tree forms that we consider. A tree is given then by a tree form and by an agenda. Now, in order to turn a tree into a sequential voting rule, we must specify how will the different members of a voting body influence the choice of paths along the tree. Since we are working with binary trees, and we want to consider methods that treat all agents on the same foot, we consider as possible methods all those that are defined by a quota q, with q between 1 and the number of voters. When confronted with two choices at any node, society will move to a pre-specified follower of that node if at least q people vote for it, and will otherwise take the opposite path.
4
A sequential voting rule will thus be fully specified once we have a tree and a quota. Of course, a voting rule is defined independently of the preferences that may be held by different agents regarding the alternatives. It sets the rules through which agents will be able to contribute to the social decision. But in order to study the behavior of different agents under these rules, we need to know what their preferences will be. And then, given a profile of preferences, we'll have all the elements to study the strategic behavior of those agents. A tree provides a game form, and a tree plus a preference profile define a game.
Although our motivation is to study the strategic behavior of voters under these sequential rules, it turns out that most of our analysis can be carried out by just knowing a dominance relation among alternatives that generalizes the notion of a tournament, and that can be used to represent the preferences of society. Whereas a tournament is any complete and asymmetric relation over alternatives, the binary relations generated by comparing alternatives according to quotas different than simple majority give rise to relations that may fail one of these two properties. Moreover, some relations that are either complete, but not asymmetric, or asymmetric and not complete, may never be obtained as the dominance relation induced by a quota and a preference profile. Yet, our main characterization results still hold for this larger class of social preferences.
Because of that, our work can also be understood as a natural extension of tournament theory, and the sets we identify can be compared to the different solution sets proposed for tournaments and for their extensions (Miller, 1977 and 1980; Shepsle and Weingast, 1984; Banks, 1985; Moulin, 1986; Banks and Bordes, 1988; Laslier, 1997) .
We first provide characterizations of the unique equilibrium outcomes obtained by iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies for each of the two families of games we consider. We then use these characterizations to identify the sets of alternatives that could be the outcome of games that share the same tree form and the same rule to choose among nodes, but differ on the agenda.
Comparisons among these sets allow us to discuss the degree of agenda manipulability of different rules in our classes. It turns out that both procedures are non-manipulable on the same set of preference profiles, namely those profiles for which there exists a (generalized) Condorcet winner, i.e. an alternative that dominates all others and in turn is not dominated. Moreover, if there is no Condorcet winner, then the successive procedure is more vulnerable towards agenda manipulation than the amendment procedure in the following sense: at any preference profile (or more generally, for any dominance relation), any outcome that can be achieved for some agenda under the amendment procedure can also be achieved by some agenda under the successive procedure, while the reverse is not true in general. Comparing different quotas we find that the set of preference profiles which do not allow for manipulation is maximized at simple majority voting and is otherwise weakly decreasing (increasing) in the quota for supermajority (minority) quotas. This gives some support for simple majority voting if the possibility of agenda manipulation is a concern. On the other hand, if at a given preference profile there are opportunities for agenda manipulation under simple majority voting, then for both the successive and the amendment procedure there may be other quotas which minimize the degree of manipulability.
The outline of the paper is the following. In section 2 we introduce general binary voting games and derive the equilibrium outcome of the voting game for the amendment and sequential procedure at a given agenda. In sections 3 and 4
we characterize the set of outcomes that can be obtained by agenda manipulation for the amendment and sequential procedures. In section 5 we compare the scope of manipulation under the amendment and successive procedures. Section 6 concludes.
Sequential Binary Voting Games
Let there be a finite set of alternatives X with #X ≥ 2. 5 A binary voting tree on X is a tree in which every non-terminal node has exactly two successors, left and right, and to every terminal node an alternative in X is assigned, so that this mapping is onto. 6 Formally, we define a binary voting tree on X to be a quadruple (X, N, , φ), such that the following conditions are satisfied.
1. N is a finite set of nodes, 2. is a binary relation on N which satisfies the following conditions.
5 #A denotes the number of elements in a finite set A. 6 For purposes of expediency we define trees directly, rather than starting with tree forms as introduced in section 1. Thus, at this stage the role of agendas is implicit, and the one suggested in section 1. It will become more explicit when we introduce the binary voting games for the amendment and successive procedure below.
(i) there exists a unique ν 0 ∈ N (the initial node) such that {ν | ν ∈ N and ν 0 ν} = ∅,
(ii) for all ν ∈ N \ {ν 0 }, there exists a unique ν ∈ N with ν ν , (iii) there exists a nonempty subset T ⊂ N of terminal nodes such that for all ν ∈ T , {ν | ν ∈ N and ν ν} = ∅,
3. φ : T → X is an onto function assigning to each terminal node a unique alternative in X.
If ν ν for ν, ν ∈ N , then we call ν a successor of ν and ν a predecessor of ν.
A non-terminal node of a binary voting tree on X is called a decision node.
Let there be n voters. Every voter i has a strict preference ordering P i over X, i.e. P i is complete (for all x, y ∈ X with x = y, it is true that xP i y or yP i x), transitive (for all x, y, z ∈ X, if xP i y and yP i z, then xP i z) and asymmetric (for all x, y ∈ X, if xP i y, then ¬yP i x). Let P = (P 1 , . . . , P n ) be the profile of voters' preferences. Then, for every binary voting tree (X, N, , φ) on X and any quota q ∈ {1, . . . , n} we can define a sequential binary voting game on X, (X, N, , φ, P, q), as follows: at every non-terminal node ν there is a q-majority vote over the successors l(ν) and r(ν), such that r(ν) wins, if at least q voters vote in favor of r(ν), and l(ν) wins otherwise. Obviously, unless n is odd and q = (n + 1)/2, the outcome of the vote may depend on the labeling of the successors of a decision node. If r(ν) wins, the next q-majority vote is over the successors l(r(ν)) and r(r(ν)) of r(ν), while if l(ν) wins, the next q-majority vote is over the successors l(l(ν)) and r(l(ν)) of l(ν). Voter i's strategy then is a function
By following the winning successors through the tree every strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , . . . , σ n ) determines a unique path from the initial node ν 0 to a terminal node ν(σ) ∈ T which is associated with a unique alternative φ(ν(σ)) ∈ X.
7 Since every decision node is assumed to have exactly two successors, we follow AustenSmith and Banks (2005) and label the successors of every ν ∈ N \ T as l(ν) (left successor), and r(ν) (right successor).
Since the sequential binary voting games defined above can have very implau- Continuing in this way we finally arrive at the initial node and we eliminate for every voter i all strategies where i does not vote for his preferred successor node.
Then, all voters are indifferent between all remaining strategy profiles and all these surviving profiles σ lead to the same alternative φ(ν(σ)) ∈ X which we call the outcome, o(X, N, , φ, P, q), of the sequential binary voting game. Hence, we 8 In voting theory dominance solvability is also known as "sophisticated voting" (see Farquharson, 1969) .
have the following result (cf. McKelvey and Niemi, 1978; Moulin, 1979; Gretlein, 1982; Austen-Smith and Banks, 2005) .
Theorem 2.1 Every sequential binary voting game (X, N, , φ, P, q) is dominance solvable.
In this paper we will focus on two specific binary voting trees on X which represent two prominent sequential voting procedures: the amendment procedure and the successive procedure. Both procedures start with an agenda, i.e. an ordering (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) of the alternatives in X, where we assume that m ≥ 2.
Amendment Procedure
Given an agenda (x 1 , . . . x m ), the binary voting tree (X, N, , φ) for the amendment procedure is such that the first vote is over x 1 and x 2 , the second vote is over the winner of the first vote and x 3 , the third vote is over the winner of the second vote and x 4 , and so on until all alternatives are exhausted. Figure 1 shows the binary voting tree for the amendment procedure in the case where m = 3. Observe that the agenda also yields a natural labeling of the two successor nodes of every non-terminal decision nodes: at every decision node ν there is a vote over two alternatives, x i and x j , where i < j. The left successor, l(ν), then is the node reached if alternative x i wins, and r(ν) is the node reached if alternative x j wins.
Consider now the sequential binary voting game (X, N, , φ, P, q) for the amendment procedure. By Theorem 2.1 the game is dominance solvable and we have seen that there is a simple backwards induction procedure to derive the unique outcome of the game. To determine this outcome, we let P denote society's preference relation over X under sincere voting with quota q, i.e. for all
Observe that for given quota q, P is either complete or asymmetric or both. In the latter case P defines a tournament. 9 By allowing P to be incomplete or to 
2. Let m ≥ 3 and suppose the outcome has been defined for any agenda with up to m − 1 alternatives. Consider the agenda (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ). Then
ν 0 Figure 2: Binary voting tree for the successive procedure with agenda (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ).
Successive Procedure
Given an agenda (x 1 , . . . x m ), the binary voting tree (X, N, , φ) for the successive procedure is such that the first vote is over the approval of x 1 . If x 1 is approved, the voting is over and the outcome is x 1 . If x 1 is rejected, the next vote is over the approval of x 2 . If x 2 is approved, the voting is over and the outcome is x 2 . Otherwise, if x 2 is rejected the next vote is over the approval of x 3 , and so on. If x m−1 is rejected, the outcome is x m . Figure 2 shows the binary voting tree for the successive procedure in the case where m = 3. Again, the agenda yields a natural labeling of the two successor nodes of every non-terminal decision nodes:
at every decision node ν there is a vote over approving or rejecting an alternative
The left successor, l(ν), then is the node reached if x i is approved, and r(ν)
is the node reached if x i is rejected.
As for the amendment procedure we consider the sequential binary voting game (X, N, , φ, P, q) for the successive procedure. Again, let P be society's preference relation over X as defined in (1). Then the outcome o S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) for the successive procedure is inductively defined over the number of alternatives in the agenda as follows.
The inductive definitions of o A (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) and o S (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ) for the amendment and successive procedure in equations (2)- (5) reveals that the outcome of an agenda only depends on society's preference relation P and is invariant with respect to changes in the individual preferences P i that leave P unchanged.
Hence, in the following we will consider the general case, where society makes binary choices according to an arbitrary preference relation P on X, which is not necessarily derived from majority voting with quota q. As long as we assume that society is forward looking in the sense that at every decision node in the binary voting tree it chooses the consequence that is preferred according to P , the outcome of an agenda for the amendment and successive procedures is still given by (2) and (3), respectively by (4) and (5).
The following two sections will provide characterizations of the outcomes that an agenda setter can achieve under the amendment and successive procedure for a given preference relation P of society.
Choosing with the Amendment Procedure
In this section we consider the case where society uses the amendment procedure for a given agenda in order to choose an alternative from X. Hence, we assume that society has a preference relation P on X and that the outcome of an agenda is determined according to (2) and (3). In order to characterize the set of alternatives that can be supported as the outcome for some agenda, we will assume that P is complete or asymmetric. 10 We first derive some auxiliary results. All proofs are in the appendix.
The first lemma provides a recursive procedure for deriving the outcome of an agenda if P is complete.
11
Lemma 3.1 Let P be complete. Then, o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) =x 1 , where the auxiliary alternativesx 1 , . . . ,x m , are recursively defined as follows.
and for
Observe that we cannot dispense with the completeness assumption in Lemma 3.1. To see this, consider the following example.
Example 3.1 Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and consider the incomplete preference relation P given by x 3 P x 1 . Let the agenda be given by (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ). Then, applying the recursive procedure in Lemma 3.1 we get
However,
12
In the case where P is complete, from Lemma 3.1 we can derive the following necessary condition for an alternative to be the outcome of an agenda.
10 These are the cases that arise if P is derived from majority voting with quota q. By c ( c ) we denote the largest (smallest) integer less (larger) than or equal to c ∈ R. Then P is complete if q ≤ n 2 , and P is asymmetric if q ≥ n 2 + 1. 11 Shepsle and Weingast (1984) have proved a similar result for the special case of tournaments, i.e. where P is derived from simple majority voting.
12 This is a counterexample to Theorem 3.4 in Banks and Bordes (1988) who claim that the recursive procedure in Lemma 3.1 applies to an incomplete preference relation P .
Corollary 3.1 Let P be complete and let x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ). Then, for all y ∈ X with y = x, at least one of the following two conditions is satisfied.
(i) ¬yP x.
(ii) There exists z ∈ X with zP y and ¬zP x.
Note that in the special case of a tournament, i.e. when P is complete and asymmetric, an alternative x belongs to the uncovered set (Miller, 1980) if and only if condition (i) and/or (ii) in Corollary 3.1 are satisfied. Hence, Corollary 3.1 recovers Miller's (1980) result that the set of sophisticated voting outcomes for the amendment procedure is a subset of the uncovered set in the case of a tournament.
The following two lemmas hold without imposing any assumptions on P .
For a given agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) define the auxiliary alternativesx 1 , . . . ,x m , bȳ
We are now ready to state our main result that provides a necessary and sufficient condition for an alternative to be the outcome of some agenda under the amendment procedure.
Theorem 3.1 Let P be complete or asymmetric. Let x ∈ X and let Y (x) = {y ∈ X | yP x and ¬xP y}.
Then there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) if and only if for all y ∈ Y , there is an alternative z(y) ∈ X, such that the following two conditions are satisfied.
(i) z(y)P y and ¬z(y)P x.
(ii) There exists an ordering (z 1 , . . . z t ) of the alternatives in
such that ¬z l P z k for all k = 1, . . . , t − 1, and for all l > k.
The proof of the theorem is in the Appendix. Let us briefly hint at the major ideas behind it. Regarding necessity, it is clear that the choice of x is threatened by the existence of the elements of Y (x), that would eliminate x if ever really confronted against it. Hence, alternatives that do not beat x but beat those in Y (x) are needed, and these are the ones in the set Z(x). The additional conditions on the dominance relation among the alternatives in Z(x)
are also needed to ensure that they can be presented in an appropriate order, so as to fulfill their role as deterrents of alternatives in Y (x). The sufficiency part consists in exhibiting a way to order the alternatives that would deliver x as an outcome, given that the conditions are satisfied. These orders depend on whether we consider the case of a complete or an asymmetric dominance relation.
For the complete case, if Y (x) is empty, then use any order, where x is the last alternative in the agenda. Otherwise, use the order
where here the order of the y i 's is any, and the x i 's stand for those alternatives other than x that do not belong to either Y (x) or to Z(x). Similarly, for the asymmetric case, if Y (x) is empty use any order, where x is the first alternative in the agenda, and if Y (x) is nonempty, use the order
where again the order of the y i 's is any, and the x i 's stand for those alternatives other than x that do not belong to either Y (x) or to Z(x).
For later use we provide the following alternative characterization of the set of attainable alternatives under the amendment procedure. It is immediate to see that the following characterization is equivalent to the one in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.2 Let P be complete or asymmetric. Let x ∈ X and let Y (x) = {y ∈ X | yP x and ¬xP y}.
Then there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with
there is a set of alternatives Z(x) with x / ∈ Z(x) and ¬zP x for all z ∈ Z(x), such that the following two conditions are satisfied.
(i) For all y ∈ Y (x) there exists a z ∈ Z(x) such that zP y.
(ii) There exists an ordering (z 1 , . . . z t ) of the alternatives in Z(x) such that ¬z l P z k for all k = 1, . . . , t − 1, and for all l > k.
Clearly, in many cases one can attain a given alternative through several orders. Therefore, no uniqueness claim is placed on the orders that we use in the sufficiency part of the proof. However, it is interesting to realize that, in the asymmetric case, placing in first place the alternative that one wants to obtain is always effective, in the following sense.
Corollary 3.2 Let P be asymmetric and let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an agenda. If for
, then there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with
The following example shows that it is not sufficient to move the outcome of an agenda one or only a few steps forward. Unless the outcome is moved to the first position in the agenda, it need not remain the outcome.
Example 3.2 Let X = {x 1 , x 2 , x 3 } and consider the asymmetric and incomplete preference relation P given by x 2 P x 1 and x 3 P x 1 .
If P is asymmetric, then Theorem 3.1 provides an alternative characterization of the set of possible outcomes to the one given in Banks and Bordes, (1988, Theorem 3.7) . 13 To state this result, we need some additional definitions. The
x ∈ X and d(y) = #X + 1. 
Choosing with the Successive Procedure
We now turn to the case where society uses the successive procedure for a given agenda in order to choose an alternative from X. Hence, we assume that society has a preference relation P on X and that the outcome of an agenda is determined according to (4) and (5). Again we first derive some auxiliary results before presenting the characterization of the set of alternatives that can be achieved as the outcome for some agenda. To this end, we define the auxiliary alternatives
13 Observe, however, that the proof of Theorem 3.7 in Banks and Bordes (1988) is incorrect whenever P is not complete, since it relies on the recursive procedure in Lemma 3.1. In
Example 3.1 we showed that this procedure does not yield the outcome of an agenda if P is not complete.
The first lemma shows that an alternative which was eliminated at some stage will never return.
Lemma 4.1 Let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an agenda. Ifx k = x s for some s ≥ k, then
Lemma 4.1 immediately implies the following result.
We are now ready to present our main characterization result.
Theorem 4.1 Let P be complete or asymmetric. Let x ∈ X and let Y (x) = {y ∈ X | yP x and ¬xP y}.
Then there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with x = o S (x 1 , . . . , x m ) if and only if there is a set of alternatives Z(x) with x / ∈ Z(x) such that the following two conditions are satisfied.
(i) For all y ∈ Y (x) there exists a z ∈ Z(x) such that zP y, if P is complete, and such that ¬yP z, if P is asymmetric.
(ii) There exists an ordering (z 1 , . . . , z t ) of the alternatives in Z(x) such that ¬z l+1 P z l for all l = 1 . . . , t − 1, and ¬z 1 P x.
Again let us briefly dwell on the major ideas of the proof which is in the Appendix. For necessity, any alternative in Y (x) which threatens x must be eliminated before it meets x. This is achieved by the alternatives in Z(x) which may in turn threaten x, but which can be placed in such an order that the alternative which actually meets x does not eliminate x. For sufficiency, we must find an order of the alternatives which delivers x as an outcome, given that the conditions are satisfied. This order again depends on whether we consider the case of a complete or an asymmetric dominance relation. For the complete case, if Y (x) is empty, then use any order, where x is the last alternative in the agenda.
Otherwise, use the order (x 1 , . . . , x m−r−1 , x, w 1 , . . . , w r ).
Here, the x i 's are all alternatives other than x that do not belong to either Y (x) or to Z(x), and the w i 's are alternatives that belong either to Y (x) or to Z(x),
and their order has to be selected in a delicate manner that is explained along the inductive proof. Similarly, for the asymmetric case, if Y (x) is empty use any order, where x is the first alternative in the agenda, and if Y (x) is nonempty, use the order
where again the x i 's are all alternatives other than x that do not belong to either Y (x) or to Z(x) and the w i 's are alternatives that belong either to Y (x) or to Z(x) and that are ordered in a specific manner.
Like for the amendment procedure, if P is asymmetric and an alternative x can be obtained as the outcome for some agenda, then x is the outcome of an agenda where x is placed first.
Corollary 4.1 Let P be asymmetric and let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an agenda. If for
. . , x m ), then there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with
We omit the proof of this corollary as it is similar to the proof of Corollary 3.2.
For the special case where P is a tournament, i.e. complete and asymmetric, Theorem 4.1 recovers the well-known result that the set of attainable outcomes under the successive procedure coincides with the top cycle (Miller, 1977) . 14 We state this as a corollary to Theorem 4.1.
Corollary 4.2 (Miller, 1977) If P is complete and asymmetric, then
. . , x m ) for some agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) if and only if x is in the top cycle of P .
On the Forms and Extent of Agenda Manipulation
In this section we focus on the possibilities that an agenda setter may find to use her power to determine the order of vote in her own favor, in order to get a most preferred alternative. In its most demanding version, non-manipulability would require that whoever is chosen as an agenda setter could not change the outcome at all, because it is the same regardless of the order of vote.
Definition 5.1 A sequential voting procedure is non-manipulable by any agenda setter at a given preference relation P if it yields the same outcome regardless of the agenda.
Note that the definition applies to any potential agenda setter.
It turns out that both the amendment and successive procedure are nonmanipulable whenever there exists a (generalized) Condorcet winner, i.e. an alternative that dominates all others and in turn is not dominated. Hence, both procedures are non-manipulable on the same set of preference profiles. In order to state this result, for any preference relation P we let O A (P ) (O S (P )) denote the set of alternatives that are outcomes for some agenda under the amendment (successive) procedure given P .
14 Let P be complete and asymmetric. The top cycle of P is the set of all alternatives x such that for all y = x, there exists a sequence of alternatives z 0 , z 1 , . . . , z s , with z 0 = x, z s = y, and z l P z l+1 for all l = 1, . . . , s − 1.
lowing statements are equivalent.
(ii) O A (P ) = {x}.
(iii) For all y = x it is true that xP y and ¬yP x.
For those profiles where several outcomes could be reached, depending on the order of vote, it is possible to compare the choice flexibility that an agenda setter may obtain from alternative rules, as expressed by the following definition.
Definition 5.2 Given two sequential voting procedures, we say that one is more agenda manipulable than the other if, for any preference relation P , the set of alternatives that are attainable by agenda manipulation under the latter is a subset of the former, and it is a strict subset for at least one preference relation P .
With this we can state our main result.
Proposition 5.1 The successive procedure is more agenda manipulable than the amendment procedure.
The claim that O A (P ) ⊆ O S (P ) for all preference relations P is an immediate implication of Theorem 3.2 and Theorem 4.1. To get an intuition for this result observe that the amendment procedure imposes stronger conditions on an alternative for it to survive the sequential voting procedure than the successive procedure. In order to obtain x as the outcome of an agenda for the successive procedure it is sufficient that x is not dominated by the outcome of some agenda for the remaining alternatives. Hence, it is sufficient to find some ordering (x 1 , . . . , x m−1 ) of the alternatives different from x, such that ¬o S (x 1 , . . . , x m−1 )P x (see (4) and (5)). By contrast, in order for x to be the outcome of the agenda (x, x 1 , . . . , x m−1 ) under the amendment procedure, x must be the outcome of any agenda (x, x k , . . . , x m−1 ) for k = 1, . . . , m − 1 (see (2) and (3)).
To verify that there exist relations P with O A (P ) O S (P ) consider the following example.
Example 5.1 Let X = {x, y, w, z} and let P be given by xP w, yP x, yP w, wP z, zP x and zP y.
In fact, only y, w, and z satisfy conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 3.1.
In what follows we analyse the role of the quota in determining the degree of manipulability of our rules for the special case where the social relation P is derived from a vote under a given quota. It turns out that the set of preference profiles at which the amendment and successive procedures are non-manipulable is maximized at simple majority voting. To state this result, we denote by Φ(q) the set of profiles P such that there exists a generalized Condorcet winner under majority voting with quota q, i.e. Φ(q) is the set of profiles at which the amendment and the successive procedures are non-manipulable given q (cf. Theorem 5.1).
In particular, Φ(q) is maximal for q = n 2 + 1, i.e. for simple majority voting.
We now fix a preference profile and compare the degree of manipulability across different quotas. Let O A (P, q) (O S (P, q)) denote the set of alternatives that are outcomes under majority voting with quota q at profile P for some agenda under the amendment (successive) procedure.
We first consider the amendment procedure. The following example shows that the sets O A (P, q) are not nested in general.
Example 5.2 Let X = {x, y, z} and let there be five voters with the following preferences.
zP i yP i x for i = 1, 2, yP i xP i z for i = 3, 4, xP 5 zP 5 y Using Theorem 3.1 it is straightforward to verify that
While there is no quota which minimizes the degree of manipulability for the amendment procedure, unanimity turns out to be the one that maximizes it.
Proposition 5.3 For every preference profile P and for all q = 1, . . . , n − 1, it is true that
The situation is somewhat different for the amendment procedure. There, the sets O S (P, q) are nested for the successive procedure if q > n 2
. Hence, simple majority is a manipulation minimizer among all qualified majorities. However, nestedness does not hold for q < n 2
. We summarize these results in the following proposition.
Proposition 5.4 Let P be an arbitrary preference profile. Then the following is true.
1. For all q, q , with
2. For q, q , with q < q ≤ n 2 + 1 the sets O S (P, q) and O S (P, q ) are
hold for all sets of alternatives X and for all voters' preferences P.
The first claim in Proposition 5.4 is proved in the appendix. To prove the second claim, observe that for the preferences in Example 5.2 we obtain
and O S (P, 2) = {y, z}.
The preference profile in Example 5.2 also demonstrates that it is not true that simple majority voting always minimizes the degree of manipulability, neither for the amendment nor for the successive procedure. In particular and quite surprisingly, in this example the minority quota q = 2 minimizes the power of the agenda setter for both procedures.
One source of the difference in the set of attainable outcomes under the amendment and successive procedure is that the former always selects an outcome in the Pareto set while the latter may also have inefficient outcomes. However, this
is not the only reason why O A (P, q) and O S (P, q) differ, as shown by Example 5.2. 16 The following proposition summarizes the relation of the Pareto set with the attainable set for the amendment procedure.
Proposition 5.5
1. For all q = 1, . . . , n, no Pareto dominated alternative is attainable under the amendment procedure, i.e. O A (P, q) ⊆ {x | there exists no y with yP i x for all i}.
2. For q ∈ {1, n} the set of outcomes O A (P, q) is the set of alternatives that are not Pareto dominated by any other alternative, i.e.
O A (P, 1) = O A (P, n) = {x | there exists no y with yP i x for all i}.
16 In this example, x ∈ O S (P, 4) and x / ∈ O A (P, 4), but x is not Pareto dominated.
Next we consider the successive procedure. Again, O S (P, 1) is the set of alternatives that are not Pareto dominated by any other alternative. However, different from the amendment procedure, for the successive procedure and q > 1 an alternative can be the outcome for some agenda even if it is Pareto dominated.
In particular, it is not true in general that O S (P, 1) = O S (P, n).
Proposition 5.6
1. O S (P, 1) = {x | there exists no y with yP i x for all i}.
2. For q > 1, there exist sets of alternatives X and voters' preferences P such that x ∈ O S (P, q) for some Pareto dominated alternative x ∈ X.
The first claim in Proposition 5.6 is proved in the appendix. The second claim is proved by the following example.
Example 5.3 Let X = {x, y, z} and let there be three voters with the following preferences:
Then x is Pareto dominated by y, but nevertheless x ∈ O S (P, 3), which can be proved either by verifying that x satisfies the condition in Theorem 4.1 or by verifying that x = o S (x, z, y).
Conclusion
It is well known that sequential voting procedures are prone to agenda manipulation except for very special cases, where there is a unique alternative which is the outcome under every agenda at a given profile of voters' preferences. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to analyze whether and how different voting procedures differ with respect to the scope of manipulation they permit. For two widely used sequential voting procedures, the amendment and the successive procedure, we have characterized the set of outcomes which can be achieved by an appropriate choice of an agenda. For the amendment procedure, our results generalize well known results for tournaments (Banks, 1985) and provide an alternative characterization to the one in Banks and Bordes (1988) in case of an asymmetric dominance relation.
Our main result is that the successive procedure is more vulnerable towards agenda manipulation than the amendment procedure for any given dominance relation, respectively for any preference profile under majority voting with quota q. This gives support to using the amendment rather than the successive procedure if the possibility of agenda manipulation is a concern in a committee or, more general, in any democratic institution. We have also shown that the set of preference profiles for which neither procedure is manipulable is maximal under simple majority voting. However, when manipulation is possible, the connection between the degree of manipulability and the choice of a quota is a complex one.
In particular, simple majority need no longer be the quota that minimizes the size of choices available to the agenda setter.
Proof of Lemma 3.1: The proof is by induction over m. For m = 2 the claim is obvious. Hence, let m ≥ 3 and assume that the claim is true for any agenda with up to m − 1 alternatives. Consider an agenda with m alternatives, (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x m ). Denote byŷ i , i = 1, 3, 4, . . . , m, the auxiliary alternatives when applying the recursive procedure to the agenda (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , . . . , x m ), and denote bŷ z i , i = 2, 3, . . . , m, the auxiliary alternatives when applying the recursive procedure to the agenda (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x m ). Then, by assumption o A (x 1 , x 3 , x 4 , . . . , x m ) = y 1 and o A (x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x m ) =ẑ 2 . Moreover, letx i be the auxiliary alternatives when applying the recursive procedure to the agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ). We have to show
First observe thatx k =ŷ k =ẑ k for k = 3, . . . , m, and thatx 2 =ẑ 2 . Consider the following cases: ¬ẑ 2 Pŷ 1 means ¬x 2 Px 3 , from which it follows thatx 3 Px 2 , ifx 2 =x 3 since P is complete. However,x 2 =x 3 impliesx 2 = x 2 which is impossible ifx 3 P x 2 . Hence, x 3 =x 2 =x 1 which proves the claim for this case.
Case 2:ŷ 1 = x 1 . In this case, for all k ≥ 3, ¬x k P x 1 . Ifẑ 2 Pŷ 1 , then by (3) o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) =ẑ 2 =x 2 . Sinceẑ 2 =x 2 andŷ 1 = x 1 ,ẑ 2 Pŷ 1 is equivalent tô
to ¬x 2 P x 1 from which it follows thatx 1 = x 1 = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) which proves the claim for this case.
Proof of Corollary 3.1: Let o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = x k . Consider x l with l > k. If x l = x l , then by Lemma 3.1 ¬x l P x k and (i) holds. Ifx l =x l+1 , then again by by Lemma 3.1 there exists l > l with x l P x l and ¬x l P x k , and hence (ii) holds.
Consider x l with l < k. Since x k = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ), by Lemma 3.1 there exists l > l with x l P x l and ¬x l P x k . Therefore, also in this case (ii) holds.
claim immediately follows from (2). So assume that the claim has been proved for all agendas with at most m − 1 alternatives and consider an agenda with m alternatives, (x 1 , . . . , x m ). By assumption, the claim holds for all k = 2, . . . , m,
and it remains to consider k = 1.
To prove necessity assume thatx 1 = x 1 . By (3),x 1 = x 1 implies that x 1 = o A (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m ). Since there are m−1 alternatives in the agenda (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m ), it follows that ¬x k P x 1 for all k = 3, . . . , m (observe that the auxiliary variables for agenda (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m ) defined in (6) are identical to those for agenda
. . , x m ) = x 1 if and only if ¬o A (x 2 , . . . , x m )P x 1 , where the latter is equivalent to ¬x 2 P x 1 .
For sufficiency assume that ¬x l P x 1 for all l = 2, . . . , m. Then, by (3),
. . , x m ) which holds if and only ifx 2 P x 1 . The latter case immediately leads to a contradiction since we have assumed that ¬x 2 P x 1 . It remains to consider the case where
Because the agenda (x 1 , x 3 . . . , x m ) has m − 1 alternatives we conclude that there must exist a k ≥ 3 withx k P x 1 which contradicts our assumption that ¬x l P x 1 for all l = 2, . . . , m. This proves the claim.
Proof of Lemma 3.3: If k = 1, nothing has to be shown. Hence, assume that k ≥ 2. The proof is by induction over m. For m = 2 we only have to consider the case k = 1, where nothing has to be proved. Hence, assume that the claim is true for any agenda with up to m ≥ 2 alternatives and consider an agenda with
). By definition of the outcome of an agenda this implies that
Since both agendas, (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ) and (x 2 , . . . , x m+1 ) have m alternatives, it follows in either case that
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We have to consider the cases, where P is complete and where P is asymmetric.
Case 1: P is complete.
Necessity: Let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an agenda with o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) = x. Nothing has to be proved if Y (x) = ∅. Hence, let Y (x) = ∅ and let y ∈ Y (x). For any alternative w we denote byŵ the corresponding auxiliary alternative defined in the recursive procedure in Lemma 3.1. Ifŷ = y, then x cannot be the outcome of any agenda: If y is a successor of x, then yP x implies thatx = x and hence x is not the outcome of the agenda. If y is a predecessor of x, thenŷ = y immediately implies that the outcome is different from x. Hence,ŷ = y which implies that there exists an alternative z(y) with z(y) = z(y) and z(y)P y. If x is the outcome of the agenda, then from z(y) = z(y) it follows that ¬z(y)P x. This proves (i).
Let Z(x) = {z | z = z(y) for some y ∈ Y (x)} and let (z 1 , . . . , z t ) be the ordering of the alternatives in Z(x) in the agenda of which x is the outcome. Since we have shown thatẑ k = z k for all k = 1, . . . , t, we conclude that (ii) must hold.
Sufficiency:
The proof is by construction. Let x be an alternative such that for all y ∈ Y (x) there exists an alternative z(y) ∈ X such that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. If Y (x) = ∅, then by completeness of P , xP y for all alternatives y = x and hence x is the outcome of any agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with x m = x.
If Y (x) = ∅, let (z 1 , . . . , z t ) be the ordering of the alternatives in Z(x) with the property as given in (ii). Observe that z k = x for all k = 1, . . . , t, since yP x and ¬xP y for all y ∈ Y (x). Take an arbitrary order (y 1 , . . . , y r ) of the alternatives in Y (x). If r + t + 1 < m, let (x 1 , . . . , x m−r−t−1 ) be an arbitrary order of the set of alternatives in X \ (Y (x) ∪ Z(x) ∪ {x}) = ∅. Consider the agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m−r−t−1 , x, y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ) (if r + t + 1 = m, the agenda is (x, y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t )). We will now verify that
. . , x m−r−t−1 , x, y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ).
We use the recursive procedure in Lemma 3.1. By construction,ẑ l = z l for all l = 1, . . . , t, andŷ l = z 1 for all l = 1, . . . , r, since for all l = 1, . . . , r, there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , t} such thatẑ k P y l . Since ¬ẑ l P x for all l = 1, . . . , t, it follows that x = x. None of the x k , k = 1, . . . , m−r−t−1, is in Y (x). Hence, by completeness of P , xP x k for all k = 1, . . . , m − r − t − 1. This implies thatx 1 =x = x and hence x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m−r−t−1 , x, y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ).
Case 2: P is asymmetric.
from Lemma 3.3 it follows thatx k = x k and then Lemma 3.2 implies that ¬x l P x k for all l > k. We will now show that ¬x l P x k for all l < k. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists l < k withx l P x k . We will prove that this implies, thatx s = x k for all s = 1, . . . , l − 1, where the case s = 1 yields a contradiction to the assumption that
The proof is by backwards induction over s: Let s = l − 1 and suppose by way of contradiction thatx l−1 = x k . Sincē
. . , x m ) and ¬x l P x k which is a contradiction. Hence,x l−1 = x k . Assume we have shown thatx s = x k for all s with t ≤ s ≤ l − 1, where 2 ≤ t ≤ l − 1. Suppose by way of contradiction that
. Continuing in this manner we conclude that
and hence x k = o A (x t−1 , x l+1 , . . . , x m ) which is impossible given thatx l P x k .
Summarizing, we have shown that there exists no l = k withx l P x k . Returning to the proof of necessity we first note that nothing has to be proved if Y (x) = ∅.
Hence, let Y (x) = ∅ and let x l P x k for some l = k. Then by our previous argument
Hence, from Lemma 3.2 it follows that there exists l > l withx l P x l . By what we have shown above ¬x l P x k . Moreover, either x l =x l and ¬x l P x k or there exists l > l withx l = x l =x l . Also in this case ¬x l P x k . This proves that for all y ∈ Y there exists z(y) ∈ X with z(y) = z(y), z(y)P y and ¬z(y)P x k , i.e. in particular (i) holds. Let Z(x) = {z | z = z(y) for some y ∈ Y (x)} and let (z 1 , . . . , z t ) be the ordering of the alternatives in Z(x) in the agenda of which x is the outcome. Since we have shown thatz k = z k for all k = 1, . . . , t, we conclude that (ii) must hold.
Sufficiency: The proof is again by construction. Let x be an alternative such that for all y ∈ Y (x) there exists an alternative z(y) ∈ X such that conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied. If Y (x) = ∅, then from Lemma 3.2 it follows that
x is the outcome of any agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with
(y 1 , . . . , y r ) be an arbitrary ordering of the alternatives in Y (x). Moreover, let (z 1 , . . . , z t ) be the ordering of the alternatives in Z(x) with the property as given in (ii). As in case 1 observe that z k = x for all k = 1, . . . , t, since yP x and ¬xP y for all y ∈ Y (x). If r + t + 1 < m, let (x 1 , . . . , x m−r−t−1 ) be an arbitrary ordering of the set of alternatives in X \ (Y (x) ∪ Z(x) ∪ {x}). Consider the agenda (x, x 1 , . . . , x m−r−t−1 , y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ) (if r + t + 1 = m, the agenda is (x, y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t )). We will now verify that
. . , x m−r−t−1 , y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ).
By Lemma 3.2 it is sufficient to show that
2. ¬o A (y k , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t )P x for all k = 1, . . . , r,
¬o
A (x k , . . . , x m−r−t−1 , y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t )P x for all k = 1, . . . , m−r−t−1, 1. follows from the fact that o A (z k , . . . , z t ) = z k and ¬z k P x for all k = 1, . . . , t.
2. will follow from the fact that o A (y k , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z t } for all k = 1, . . . , r, and ¬z s P x for all s = 1, . . . , t. We prove the latter by showing that
for any agenda with y 1 , . . . , y l ∈ Y (x) and l = 1, . . . , r. The proof is by induction over l. Let l = 1. Then o A (y 1 , z 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z t } because otherwise, by Lemma 3.2, ¬z k P y 1 for all k = 1, . . . , t, contradicting the definition of the set Z(x). Suppose (7) has been shown for all subsets of Y (x) with at most l ≥ 1 alternatives, where l ≤ r − 1. Consider now the agenda (y 1 , . . . , y l+1 , z 1 , . . . , z t ) with l + 1 alternatives from Y (x). By definition of the outcome of an agenda,
Since there are l alternatives from Y (x) in the agendas (y 1 , y 3 , . . . , y l+1 , z 1 , . . . , z t ) and (y 2 , . . . , y l+1 , z 1 , . . . , z t ) it follows that the outcome of these agendas is an alternative in Z(x) and hence also o A (y 1 , . . . , y l+1 , z 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z t }. This proves 2.
To prove 3. suppose by way of contradiction that
. . , x m−r−t−1 , y 1 , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . , z t ) ∈ {y 1 , . . . , y r }.
Using Lemma 3.3 we conclude that there exists k ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that y k = o A (y k , . . . , y r , z 1 , . . . z t ). However, this contradicts (7) and hence 3. holds as claimed.
Proof of Corollary 3.2:
17 Then by Theorem 3.1 for all y ∈ Y (x), there exists an alternative z(y) ∈ X, such that z(y)P y and ¬z(y)P x, and there exists an ordering (z 1 , . . . z s ) of the alternatives in Z(y) = {z | z = z(y) for some y ∈ Y (x)}, such that ¬z l P z k for all k = 1, . . . , s − 1, and for all l > k. Given the latter condition is satisfied, the proof of Theorem 3.1 has shown that there exists an agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with
Proof of Corollary 3.3: Let P be asymmetric and let x be an alternative such that there exists a maximal trajectory (X , d) with d(x) = t, where t = #X . Let 17 Observe that yP x implies ¬xP y since P is asymmetric.
) is a trajectory, it follows that
and ¬z k P z l for all k = 1, . . . , t − 2, and for all t − 1 ≥ l > k.
Consider the set
is a maximal trajectory. Since ¬z l P x by (8), z(y) := z l fulfills condition (i)
in Theorem 3.1. Moreover, if we let Z(x) = {z 1 , . . . , z t−1 }, then by (9) condition (ii) in Theorem 3.1 is satisfied for the ordering (z 1 , . . . , z t−1 ). Hence,
. This proves the first part of the claim.
. . , z t ) satisfy condition (ii) in Theorem 3.1.
Then ({z 1 , . . . , z t , x}, d) with d(z l ) = t − l + 1 for l = 1, . . . , t, and d(x) = t + 1 is a trajectory. If for all y / ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z t , x} with ¬yP x it holds that xP y or z l P y for some l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, then ({z 1 , . . . , z t , x}, d) is a maximal trajectory and we are done. If, instead ¬xP y and ¬z l P y for all l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, then consider the trajectory ({z 1 , . . . , z t , y, x}, d ) with d (z l ) = t − l + 1 for l = 1, . . . , t, d (y) = t + 1 and d (x) = t + 2. If for all y / ∈ {z 1 , . . . , z t , y, x} with ¬y P x it holds that xP y or yP y or z l P y for some l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, then ({z 1 , . . . , z t , y, x}, d ) is a maximal trajectory and we are done. If, instead ¬xP y , ¬yP y and ¬z l P y for all l ∈ {1, . . . , t}, then consider the trajectory ({z 1 , . . . , z t , y, y , x}, d ) with
As before, either ({z 1 , . . . , z t , y, y , x}, d ) is a maximal trajectory and we are done or we can add another alternative in the same manner as above. In any case, after a finite number of steps we end up with a maximal trajectory that has x as the last alternative. This proves the claim.
18 Observe that yP x implies ¬xP y since P is asymmetric.
Proof of Lemma 4.1: Let (x 1 , . . . , x m ) be an agenda withx k = x s for some s ≥ k. The proof is by backwards induction over l < k. Let l = k − 1. Then by definitionx k−1 ∈ {x k−1 ,x k } and sincex k = x s by assumption, it follows that
Suppose the claim has been proven for all l with t ≤ l < k, where 2 ≤ t ≤ k − 1. Since by definitionx l−1 ∈ {x l−1 ,x l } and sincex l = x s by assumption, it follows thatx l−1 = x s .
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Let x k = o S (x 1 , . . . , x m ) for some 1 ≤ k ≤ m, and suppose by way of contradiction thatx l = x k for some l ≤ k. By Lemma 4.1 this implies thatx s = x k for all s < l contradicting the fact that x k =x 1 .
Let 1 ≤ k ≤ m and letx l = x k for all l ≤ k. In particular, we havē
. . , x m ) = x k which proves the claim.
Proof of Theorem 4.1:
1. Let P be complete.
Hence, let Y (x k ) = ∅ and let Y (x k ) = {x l(1) , . . . , x l(r) }, where l(1) < l(2) < . . . < l(r). From Lemma 4.2 it follows that k < l(1). We now construct a sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the following properties:
• ¬z l P z l+1 for all l = 1, . . . , t − 1.
• ¬z t P x k .
• x = z s for all s = 1, . . . , t.
• For all k = 1, . . . , r, there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with z s P y k .
Renumbering the alternatives such that z s = z t−s+1 for s = 1, . . . , t, and defining Z(x) = {z 1 , . . . , z t }, this will prove necessity.
Define z 1 = o S (x l(r) , x l(r)+1 , . . . , x m ) and
Suppose s(1) ≤ l(1). Then z 1 P x l(j) for all j = 1, . . . , r − 1. If ¬z 1 P x k it follows that z 1 = x l(r) and hence z 1 P x l(r) . In this case we are done because the sequence (z 1 ) has all the properties specified above. If z 1 P x k , define z 2 = x s(1)−1 . Then, by definition of s(1), ¬z 1 P z 2 which implies z 2 P z 1 since P is complete. Moreover, either z 1 = x l(r) and hence z 1 P x l(r) , or z 1 = x l(r) and z 2 P x l(r) . If ¬z 2 P x k we are done because the sequence (z 1 , z 2 ) has all the properties specified above. If z 2 P x k there exists an s(2) with k < s(2) < s(1) such that ¬z 2 P x s(2) . Let z 3 = x s(2) . If ¬z 3 P x k we are done because the sequence (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) has all the properties specified above.
Otherwise, we continue in the same manner. Since
after finitely many steps we arrive at an alternative z t with ¬z t P x k . The sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) has all the properties specified above.
Suppose now that l(j) < s(1) ≤ l(j + 1) for some j with 1 ≤ j ≤ r − 1.
Then z 1 P x l(i) for all i = j + 1, . . . , r − 1. Define z 2 = x s(1)−1 . Then ¬z 1 P z 2 and again either z 1 P x l(r) , or z 2 P x l(r) . Define
Observe that s(2) < s(1). If s(2) ≤ l(1) we can use the same argument as in the case where s(1) ≤ l(1) to construct a sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the desired properties. If l(i) < s(2) ≤ l(i + 1) for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, define z 3 = x s(2)−1 . Then ¬z 2 P z 3 , and if i < j, then z 2 P x l(h) for all
Again, either s(3) ≤ l(1) and we can follow the proof for the case where
Continuing in this manner we see that after finitely many steps we arrive at an index s(K) with s(K) ≤ l(1) and we can follow the argument in the proof for the case where s(1) ≤ l(1). This proves the existence of a sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the desired properties. and an ordering (z 1 , . . . , z t ) of the alternatives in Z(x) such that
• for all y ∈ Y (x), there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with z s P y,
• ¬z l+1 P z l for all l = 1, . . . , t − 1,
We now define an agenda (w 1 , . . . , w r ) with o
. If Y = ∅, then let r = t and w s = z s for all s = 1, . . . , t.
In this case it immediately follows that o S (w 1 , . . . , w r ) = z 1 . If Y = ∅ let (w 1 , . . . , w r ) be the agenda that is obtained if all y ∈ Y with z t P y (if any)
are placed between z t−1 and z t , all y ∈ Y with ¬z t P y and z t−1 P y (if any)
are placed between z t−2 and z t−1 , and so on, and finally all y ∈ Y with ¬z s P y for all s = 2, . . . , t, and z 1 P y (if any) are placed before z 1 . Then, by definition Y (x) ∪ Z(x) = {w 1 , . . . , w r }, and o S (w 1 , . . . , w r ) = z 1 .
If Y (x) ∪ Z(x) ∪ {x} = X, then it follows that
This proves sufficiency.
2. Let P be asymmetric. The proof is very similar to the proof for a complete relation P .
• For all k = 1, . . . , r, there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with ¬y k P z s .
Again, renumbering the alternatives such that z s = z t−s+1 for s = 1, . . . , t, and defining Z(x) = {z 1 , . . . , z t }, this will prove necessity.
. . , x m ) and
Suppose s(1) ≤ l(1). Then z 1 P x l(j) , which implies ¬x l(j) P z 1 for all j = 1, . . . , r − 1, by asymmetry of P . If ¬z 1 P x k it follows that z 1 = x l(r) and hence z 1 P x l(r) . Since P is asymmetric, the latter implies that ¬x l(r) P z 1 .
In this case we are done because the sequence (z 1 ) has all the properties specified above. If z 1 P x k , define z 2 = x s(1)−1 . Then ¬z 1 P z 2 , and either z 1 = x l(r) and hence z 1 P x l(r) , which implies that ¬x l(r) P z 1 since P is asymmetric.
Or z 1 = x l(r) and hence ¬x l(r) P z 2 . If ¬z 2 P x k we are done because the sequence (z 1 , z 2 ) has all the properties specified above. If z 2 P x k there exists an s(2) with k < s(2) < s(1) such that ¬z 2 P x s(2) . Let z 3 = x s(2) . If ¬z 3 P x k we are done because the sequence (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 ) has all the properties specified above. Otherwise, we continue in the same manner. Since
. . , x m ), after finitely many steps we arrive at an alternative z t with ¬z t P x k . The sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) has all the properties specified above.
Then z 1 P x l(i) for all i = j + 1, . . . , r − 1, which implies that ¬x l(i) P z 1 for all i = j + 1, . . . , r − 1, since P is asymmetric. Define z 2 = x s(1)−1 . Then ¬z 1 P z 2 and again either ¬x l(r) P z 1 , or ¬x l(r) P z 2 . Define
Observe that s(2) < s(1). If s(2) ≤ l(1) we can use the same argument as in the case where s(1) ≤ l(1) to construct a sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the desired properties. If l(i) < s(2) ≤ l(i + 1) for some i with 1 ≤ i ≤ r − 1, define z 3 = x s(2)−1 . Then ¬z 2 P z 3 , and if i < j, then z 2 P x l(h) for all h = i + 1, . . . , j, which implies that ¬x l(h) P z 2 for all h = i + 1, . . . , j.
Define
Continuing in this manner we see that after finitely many steps we arrive at an index s(K) with s(K) ≤ l(1) and we can follow the argument in the proof for the case where s(1) ≤ l(1). This proves the existence of a sequence (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the desired properties.
. . , x m ) for any agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) with x 1 = x and we are done.
Let Y (x) = ∅. Then there exists a set of alternatives Z(x) with x / ∈ Z(x)
and an ordering (z 1 , . . . , z t ) of the alternatives in Z(x) such that
• for all y ∈ Y (x), there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with ¬yP z s ,
In this case it immediately follows that o S (w 1 , . . . , w r ) = z 1 . If Y = ∅ let (w 1 , . . . , w r ) be the agenda that is obtained if all y ∈ Y with ¬yP z t (if any) are placed after z t , all y ∈ Y with yP z t and ¬yP z t−1 (if any) are placed between z t−1 and z t , and so on, and finally all y ∈ Y with yP z s for all s = 2, . . . , t, and ¬yP z 1 (if any) are placed between z 1 and z 2 . Then, by definition Y (x) ∪ Z(x) = {w 1 , . . . , w r }, and o S (w 1 , . . . , w r ) = z 1 .
. . , x m−r−1 }, where r ≤ m − 2, then ¬x s P x for all s = 1, . . . , m − r − 1, which implies that
Proof of Corollary 4.2: Let P be complete and asymmetric. Assume first that
. . , x m ) for some agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m ) and let y ∈ X, y = x. If xP y, then define z 0 = x and z 1 = y. If ¬xP y, then yP x by completeness of P . In this case, by Theorem 4.1 there exists a sequence of alternatives (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the following properties:
• There exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, such that z s P y,
By completeness of P it follows that z l P z l+1 for all l = 1, . . . , t − 1, and xP z 1 .
This proves that x is in the top cycle of P .
For the reverse, let x be in the top cycle of P and let Y (x) = {y | yP x and ¬xP y}. for any agenda with x m−1 = x and x m = y by Lemma 4.1. This contradicts our assumption that O S (P ) = {x}. Hence, also for P complete, O S (P ) = {x} implies that (iii) holds.
(ii) ⇐⇒ (iii): Assume (iii), i.e. xP y and ¬yP x for all y = x. Then, by The- Then, by Lemma 3.1, x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m−2 , x, y), where (x 1 , . . . , x m−2 ) is an arbitrary ordering of the alternatives different from x and y. This contradicts our assumption that O A (P ) = {x}. Hence, O A (P ) = {x} implies that ¬yP x for all y = x. Since P is complete, this implies (iii).
Next consider the case where P is asymmetric. Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists y with ¬xP y. We then claim that x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m ) for any agenda with x 1 = y and x m = x. The claim is proved by induction over m.
If m = 2 the claim is immediate. Suppose now that the claim is true for m ≥ 2 and consider the agenda (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) with x 1 = y and x m+1 = x. Suppose by way of contradiction that x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ). By definition of the amendment procedure, o A (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) ∈ {o A (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ), o A (x 2 , . . . , x m+1 )}.
Since the agenda (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ) has m alternatives, it follows that x = o A (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ). Then, x = o A (x 1 , . . . , x m+1 ) implies that x = o A (x 2 , . . . , x m+1 ) and xP o A (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ).
Since x 1 = y and ¬xP y it follows that o A (x 1 , x 3 , . . . , x m+1 ) = x k for some k with 3 ≤ k ≤ m. Lemma 3.3 then implies that x k = o A (x k , . . . , x m+1 ) =x k . But then, ¬x m+1 P x k by Lemma 3.2. Sincex m+1 = x m+1 = x this is a contradiction to (10).
This proves our claim.
Hence, O A (P ) = {x} implies that xP y for all y = x. Finally, by asymmetry of P we conclude that ¬yP x for all y = x, i.e. (iii) holds.
Proof of Proposition 5.2: Consider first the case where 1 ≤ q < q ≤ n 2 + 1 and let P ∈ Φ(q). Then, by definition of Φ(q) there exists an alternative x such that for all y = x, #{i | xP i y} ≥ q and #{i | yP i x} < q.
Observe that #{i | yP i x} = n − #{i | xP i y} < q implies that #{i | xP i y} ≥ q since q < n 2 + 1. Hence, (11) 
This implies
#{i | yP i x} < n − 1 2 = n 2 < n 2 + 1.
Hence, P ∈ Φ( n 2 + 1), i.e. Φ( n 2 ) ⊆ Φ( nasymmetric. Let x ∈ O S (P, q). If, for all y ∈ X, #{i | yP i x} < q , then x ∈ O S (P, q ) and we are done. Otherwise, let Y (x) = {y | #{i | yP i x} ≥ q } = ∅.
Then, for all y ∈ Y (x), #{i | yP i x} ≥ q and by Theorem 4.1 there exists a sequence of distinct alternatives (z 1 , . . . , z t ) with the following properties:
• for all y with #{i | yP i x} ≥ q there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with #{i | yP i z s } < q,
• #{i | z l+1 P i z l } < q for all l = 1, . . . , t − 1,
• #{i | z 1 P i x} < q.
Since q > q this implies that
• for all y with #{i | yP i x} ≥ q there exists an s, 1 ≤ s ≤ t, with #{i | yP i z s } < q ,
• #{i | z 1 P i x} < q .
Hence, by Theorem 4.1 x ∈ O S (P, q ) which proves the claim.
Proof of Proposition 5.5:
1. Let q ∈ {1, . . . , n} and let x ∈ O A (P, q). Suppose by way of contradiction that x is Pareto dominated by some alternative y, i.e. yP i x for all voters i.
Then y ∈ Y (x) and by Theorem 3.1 there exists an alternative z(y) such that #{i | z(y)P i y} ≥ q
and #{i | z(y)P i x} < q.
However, since yP i x for all voters i, (14) implies that #{i | z(y)P i x} ≥ q contradicting (15). Hence, x is not Pareto dominated by any alternative y. • there exists an s ∈ {1, . . . , t} and a voter j with z s P j y,
• z l P i z l+1 for all voters i and for all l = 1, . . . , t − 1,
• xP i z 1 for all voters i.
However, this implies that xP j z 1 P j z 2 . . . P j z s P j y contradicting the assumption that y Pareto dominates x. Hence, no alternative in O S (P, 1) is Pareto dominated, which proves the claim.
